Intention and sexual consent. (31st August 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Liberto, Hallie
• Is Part Of: Philosophical explorations. Volume 20(2017)Supplement 2
• Page Start: 127
• Page End: 141
• Publication Date: 2017-08-31
• Subjects: intention -- consent -- sexual consent -- deception; Philosophy of mind -- Periodicals; Act (Philosophy) -- Periodicals; 128
• DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2017.1356359
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1386-9795

Abstract

Abstract : In this paper I first argue that we do not need to intend all the features of X in order to consent to X. I will present cases in which agents intend to consent to gambles, and intend to consent to have sex with people under certain descriptions, de re, rather than de dicto . Next, I argue that deception – even deception about features of a sexual act that qualify as "deal-breakers" for a participant – might not always have the power to undermine sexual consent. In both sections I craft my arguments by appealing to a proposal about the scope of rights. I suggest that we may have intentions regarding our sexual experiences that do not map onto the rights that we actually hold pertaining to those sexual experiences.