Efficient and strategy‐proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods. Issue 3 (22nd September 2017)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- Efficient and strategy‐proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods. Issue 3 (22nd September 2017)
- Main Title:
- Efficient and strategy‐proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
- Authors:
- Momi, Takeshi
- Abstract:
- Abstract : In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto‐efficient and strategy‐proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.
- Is Part Of:
- Theoretical economics. Volume 12:Issue 3(2017)
- Journal:
- Theoretical economics
- Issue:
- Volume 12:Issue 3(2017)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 12, Issue 3 (2017)
- Year:
- 2017
- Volume:
- 12
- Issue:
- 3
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2017-0012-0003-0000
- Page Start:
- 1267
- Page End:
- 1306
- Publication Date:
- 2017-09-22
- Subjects:
- Social choice -- strategy‐proofness -- Pareto efficiency -- exchange economy
D71
Economics -- Periodicals
330.01 - Journal URLs:
- http://bibpurl.oclc.org/web/12933 ↗
http://www.econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/issue/archive ↗
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ ↗ - DOI:
- 10.3982/TE1792 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 1933-6837
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 4687.xml