What is extreme about Mises's extreme apriorism?. Issue 3 (3rd July 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Scheall, Scott
• Is Part Of: Journal of economic methodology. Volume 24:Issue 3(2017)
• Page Start: 226
• Page End: 249
• Publication Date: 2017-07-03
• Subjects: Ludwig von Mises -- apriorism -- Austrian economics -- Terence Hutchison -- Mark Blaug -- F.A. Hayek; Economics -- Methodology -- Periodicals; 330.072
• DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2017.1356439
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1350-178X

Abstract

Abstract : There is something extreme about Ludwig von Mises's methodological apriorism, namely, his epistemological justification of the a priori element(s) of economic theory. His critics have long recognized and attacked the extremeness of Mises's epistemology of a priori knowledge. However, several of his defenders have neglected what is (and what has long been recognized by his critics to be) extreme about Mises's apriorism. Thus, the argument is directed less against Mises than against those contributions to the secondary literature that assert his methodological moderation while overlooking what the most prominent critics have found extreme about Mises's apriorism. Defending Mises as a merely moderate apriorist because he held only a narrow part of the foundation of economics to be a priori is a straw-man defense against criticisms of his apriorism as epistemologically extreme.