Non‐factualism Versus Nominalism. (3rd November 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Plebani, Matteo
• Is Part Of: Pacific philosophical quarterly. Volume 98:Number 3(2017)
• Page Start: 344
• Page End: 362
• Publication Date: 2015-11-03
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/papq.12116
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0279-0750

Abstract

Abstract: The platonism/nominalism debate in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the question whether numbers and other mathematical objects exist. Platonists believe the answer to be in the positive, nominalists in the negative. According to non‐factualists (about mathematical objects), the question is 'moot', in the sense that it lacks a correct answer. Elaborating on ideas from Stephen Yablo, this article articulates a non‐factualist position in the philosophy of mathematics and shows how the case for non‐factualism entails that standard arguments for rival positions fail. In particular, showing how and why non‐factualists reject nominalism illuminates the originality and interest of their position.