A Millian Objection to Reasons as Evidence. Issue 3 (8th July 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: FLETCHER, GUY
• Is Part Of: Utilitas. Volume 25:Issue 3(2013)
• Page Start: 417
• Page End: 420
• Publication Date: 2013-07-08
• Subjects: Utilitarianism -- Periodicals; 171.5
• DOI: 10.1017/S0953820813000095
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0953-8208

Abstract

Abstract : Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star have recently proposed the following theory of reasons:Reasons as Evidence : Necessarily, a fact F is a reason for an agent A to Φ iff F is evidence that A ought to Φ (where Φ is either a belief or an action). In this article I present an objection, inspired by Mill's proof of the principle of utility, to the right-to-left reading of the biconditional. My claim is that the fact that you can perform some action can be evidence that you ought to do it without, itself, being a reason to do it. If this is true then Reasons as Evidence is false.