Representative democracy and policy-making in the administrative state: is agency policy-making necessarily better?. (4th June 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Krause, George A.
• Is Part Of: Journal of public policy. Volume 33:Number 2(2013:Aug.)
• Page Start: 111
• Page End: 135
• Publication Date: 2013-06-04
• Subjects: administrative state, -- delegate, -- policy-making, -- policy-making venue, -- representative democracy, -- trustee; Policy sciences -- Periodicals; 351.007205
• DOI: 10.1017/S0143814X13000044
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0143-814X

Abstract

Abstract: This study focuses on how voters and politicians rationally select a preferred policy-making venue (Politician or Agency), and its implications for the principal-agent relationship between voters and politicians in a representative democracy. This study allows for incomplete information, as well as solving for the comparative static conditions pertaining to the extent that a politician's policy-making venue choices mirror those preferred by a representative voter. The comparative static results highlight when a politician (1) chooses the representative voter's preferred policy-making venue ( Active or Passive Political Responsiveness ); (2) is able to choose freely either policy-making venue without committing agency loss ( Political Discretion ); and (3) willing to deviate from the representative voter's preferred policy-making venue ( Political Shirking ). In contrast to the study by Spence, this study analytically demonstrates that one cannot infer that the benefits accrued from agency policy-making will necessarily exceed those from electoral institutions.