Moral Status, Final Value, and Extrinsic Properties. Issue 3 (December 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Delon, Nicolas
• Is Part Of: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy. Volume 114:Issue 3:Part 3(2014)
• Page Start: 371
• Page End: 379
• Publication Date: 2014-12
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00379.x
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0066-7374

Abstract

Abstract : Starting from a distinction between intrinsic and final value, I explore the implications of the supervenience of final value on extrinsic properties regarding moral status. I make a case for 'extrinsic moral status' based on 'extrinsic final value'. I show that the assumption of 'moral individualism', that moral status supervenes merely on intrinsic properties, is misguided, and results from a conflation of intrinsic with final value. I argue that at least one extrinsic property, namely vulnerability, can be the basis of both final value and moral status, and that dependence on such extrinsic properties is compatible with the requirement of agent‐neutrality.