Corruption and the public display of wealth. (16th May 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen
• Is Part Of: Journal of public economic theory. Volume 19:Number 4(2017:Aug.)
• Page Start: 827
• Page End: 840
• Publication Date: 2017-05-16
• Subjects: Economic policy -- Periodicals; Finance, Public -- Periodicals; 338.9005
• DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12247
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1097-3923

Abstract

Abstract : We study an agent–client model of corruption, in which potential corruptors are uncertain about the probability with which officials are subjected to an audit, either high or low. We characterize a signaling equilibrium, in which officials who are less likely to be audited engage in public conspicuous consumption, whereas those who are more likely to be audited do not. In this equilibrium, officials are better off than in the equilibria without conspicuous consumption. The signaling equilibrium exists if the officials' bargaining power vis‐à‐vis potential corruptors is sufficiently high, which implies that corruption can be curbed by creating competition among officials.