Reflections on Persimals. (September 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Schechtman, Marya
• Is Part Of: Southern journal of philosophy. Volume 52(2014)Supplement 1
• Page Start: 163
• Page End: 170
• Publication Date: 2014-09
• Subjects: 105
• DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12070
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0038-4283

Abstract

Abstract: Steven Luper offers richly‐textured arguments against the Embodied Part View developed by Jeff McMahan and offered as an answer to the "too many thinkers" problem. One of the major objections he raises is connected to McMahan's claim that the mind, and so the person, is to be identified with the part of the brain in which consciousness is directly realized. This view has the implausible consequence, Luper argues, that persons do not and cannot think or reason or have desires or interests. While this is indeed a worrisome consequence, it is not clear that McMahan is committed to the understanding of what constitutes "the part of the brain in which consciousness is directly realized" that Luper attributes to him. Making reference to McMahan's Theory of Time‐Relative Interests, I develop an alternate way of reading this phrase, one which avoids the difficulties Luper raises. I acknowledge that my understanding yields a view that, while formally consistent, is unattractive in a variety of ways. I suggest, however, that this should not be taken as a reason to favor animalism, since animalism has its own difficulties, which are not entirely unlike those faced by the Embodied Part View.