Dual frames for causal induction: the normative and the heuristic. (3rd July 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Hattori, Ikuko; Hattori, Masasi; Over, David E.; Takahashi, Tatsuji; Baratgin, Jean
• Is Part Of: Thinking & reasoning. Volume 23:Number 3(2017)
• Page Start: 292
• Page End: 317
• Publication Date: 2017-07-03
• Subjects: Causal induction -- dual frames -- negation -- intervention -- commitment; Thought and thinking -- Periodicals; Reasoning (Psychology) -- Periodicals; 153.43
• DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2017.1316314
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1354-6783

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Causal induction in the real world often has to be quick and efficient as well as accurate. We propose that people use two different frames to achieve these goals. The A-frame consists of heuristic processes that presuppose rarity and can detect causally relevant factors quickly. The B-frame consists of analytic processes that can be highly accurate in detecting actual causes. Our dual frame theory implies that several factors affect whether people use the A-frame or the B-frame in causal induction: among these are symmetrical negation, intervention and commitment. This theory is tested and sustained in two experiments. The results also provide broad support for dual process accounts of human thinking in general.