Against compassion: in defence of a "hybrid" concept of empathy. (27th September 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Morgan, Alastair
• Is Part Of: Nursing philosophy. Volume 18:Number 3(2017:Jul.)
• Page Start: n/a
• Page End: n/a
• Publication Date: 2016-09-27
• Subjects: compassion -- empathy -- expressive understanding -- hybrid empathy -- phenomenology -- vulnerability; Nursing -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Nursing -- Periodicals; 610.17
• DOI: 10.1111/nup.12148
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1466-7681

Abstract

Abstract: In this article, I argue that the recent emphasis on compassion in healthcare practice lacks conceptual richness and clarity. In particular, I argue that it would be helpful to focus on a larger concept of empathy rather than compassion alone and that compassion should be thought of as a component of this larger concept of empathy. The first part of the article outlines a critique of the current discourse of compassion on three grounds. This discourse naturalizes, individualizes, and reifies compassion leading to a decontextualized and simplified understanding of failures in healthcare practice. The second part uses resources from phenomenology and contemporary moral philosophy to construct a "hybrid" concept of empathy that includes both pre‐reflective/intuitive and cognitive/imaginative components. This "hybrid" concept of empathy leads to a more complex understanding of the multiple responses to others' distress. I conclude that there are no straightforward normative naturalistic responses to others' distress. Rather than conceptualizing compassion as a naturalistic impulse or a character‐based trait, we need to consider the complexity of our empathic recognition of vulnerable others.