Resource Conflict Resolution in China. (10th April 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Zhan, Jing Vivian; Ming, Zeng
• Is Part Of: China quarterly. Number 230(2017)
• Page Start: 489
• Page End: 511
• Publication Date: 2017-04-10
• Subjects: China, -- conflict resolution and prevention, -- mediation, -- mineral resources, -- redistribution; 中国, -- 冲突化解与预防, -- 调解, -- 矿产资源, -- 再分配; China -- History -- Periodicals; China -- Periodicals; 951
• DOI: 10.1017/S030574101700056X
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0305-7410

Abstract

Abstract: Mineral resource extraction has frequently caused social tensions in China. This research examines the reactive and pre-emptive strategies used by the Chinese state to cope with resource conflicts. Based on extensive fieldwork in multiple mining areas, we find that the Chinese local state actively mediates between the mining sector and local citizens, and skilfully suppresses collective protests. More importantly, it pre-emptively intervenes in dispute-prone processes and redistributes resource wealth to create vested interests and mitigate popular grievances. We argue that the active state intervention in resource conflicts in China is driven by the party-state's tight control of local officials, which prevents local capture by resource interests, and enabled by the party-state's deep reach into society, which allows grassroots governments to negotiate between conflicting interests and mobilize resources towards conflict resolution. 摘要: 矿产资源开发在中国导致了频繁的社会冲突。本研究考察中国政府应对资源冲突的回应性及预防性策略。通过在中国多个矿区的深度调研, 我们发现, 中国地方政府会积极调解矿企与当地群众之间的矛盾并巧妙地压制集体抗议以解决资源冲突。此外, 地方政府更会采取预防性措施, 主动干预矿企与民众之间的交易以防纠纷的产生, 并且通过分享资源财富以赢得民心和化解民怨。我们认为, 中国地方政府之所以会积极干预资源冲突, 其动力和能力缺一不可。一方面, 中共政权对于地方官员的严格控制一定程度上遏制了地方政府与矿企的官商勾结, 自上而下的维稳压力是地方政府解决资源冲突的根本动力。另一方面, 中共党国体制对中国社会的深入掌控则赋予了基层政府在不同利益群体之间斡旋和调配资源以解决冲突的能力。