ADAM SMITH ON JUSTICE, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND ULTIMATE JUSTICE. Issue 1 (14th June 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Otteson, James R.
• Is Part Of: Social philosophy and policy. Volume 34:Issue 1(2017)
• Page Start: 123
• Page End: 143
• Publication Date: 2017-06-14
• Subjects: Adam Smith, -- justice, -- social justice, -- Peter Singer, -- John Tomasi, -- Thomas Piketty, -- Martha Nussbaum; Social policy -- Periodicals; Social sciences -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; 303.01
• DOI: 10.1017/S0265052517000061
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0265-0525

Abstract

Abstract: Adam Smith argues that virtue falls into two broad categories: "justice, " which he calls a "negative" virtue because it principally comprises restraint from harming or injuring others; and "beneficence, " which he calls "positive" because it comprises the actions we ought to take to improve others' situations. Smith's conception of justice is thus quite "thin, " and some critics argue that it is indeed too thin, since it fails to incorporate substantive concerns for the well-being of others. In this essay, I lay out Smith's conception of justice and offer a way to understand it that attempts to comprehend the various things he says about it. I then offer a cluster of objections drawing on criticisms that might fall under the heading of "social justice." Finally, I suggest how Smith might respond to the criticisms by outlining a Smithian conception of what I call "ultimate justice."