ROBUST POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE PRIORITY OF MARKETS. Issue 1 (14th June 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Pennington, Mark
• Is Part Of: Social philosophy and policy. Volume 34:Issue 1(2017)
• Page Start: 1
• Page End: 24
• Publication Date: 2017-06-14
• Subjects: Nonideal theory, -- robust political economy, -- markets, -- democracy, -- comparative institutions; Social policy -- Periodicals; Social sciences -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; 303.01
• DOI: 10.1017/S0265052517000012
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0265-0525

Abstract

Abstract: This essay offers a "nonideal" case for giving institutional priority to markets and private contracting in the basic structure of society. It sets out a "robust political economy" framework to examine how different political economic regime types cope with frictions generated by the epistemic limitations of decision-makers and problems of incentive incompatibility. Focusing on both efficiency arguments and distributive justice concerns the essay suggests that a constitutional structure that prioritizes consensual exchange is more likely to sustain a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.