A Stackelberg game approach for multiple energies trading in integrated energy systems. (15th August 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Wei, F.; Jing, Z.X.; Wu, Peter Z.; Wu, Q.H.
• Is Part Of: Applied energy. Volume 200(2017)
• Page Start: 315
• Page End: 329
• Publication Date: 2017-08-15
• Subjects: Integrated energy system -- Strategic substitutes -- Submodular -- Stackelberg game -- Best response algorithm; Power (Mechanics) -- Periodicals; Energy conservation -- Periodicals; Energy conversion -- Periodicals; 621.042
• DOI: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.05.001
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0306-2619

Abstract

Highlights: The multiple energies trading (MET) problem in the integrated energy system is analyzed. A multi-leader multi-follower (MLMF) Stackelberg game model is proposed. The strategic substitutive behaviors of distributed energy stations in the MET are proved. The uniqueness of Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) of the MET game is proved. A best response algorithm for obtaining the SE in an iterative way is developed. Abstract: In this paper, we propose a novel game model based on the hierarchical Stackelberg game for analyzing the multiple energies trading (MET) problem in integrated energy systems (IESs). In the proposed game model, a number of distributed energy stations (DESs) lead the game deciding the unit prices of electricity and cooling energies they generated, while multiple energy users (EUs) perform as followers determining the amounts of energies to consume. In addition to maximizing the profit of each DES, the proposed hierarchical game model also considers the benefit of each EU, who actively participates in the MET. We prove that, for the first time, there exists a unique Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) in the MET, so that the existence of an equilibrium strategy optimizing the objectives of all participants can be guaranteed. Moreover, we found that the price setting game played by DESs is a submodular game when energy dispatching is performed during their generation process, which indicates that the behaviors of DESs are strategic substitutes. Furthermore, the SE is obtained in a closed-form, by which the effects of coupling generation of multiple energies are analyzed. Finally, a best response algorithm is provided to obtain the SE in an iterative way. Numerical studies demonstrate the convergency of the proposed best response algorithm, corroborate the jointly effects of market scale and exogenous parameter on the SE and verify the practicability of the proposed game-theoretic approach.