Play It Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning From Finitely repeated Dilemma Games. (25th July 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis
• Is Part Of: Economic journal. Volume 127:Number 602(2017)
• Page Start: 1069
• Page End: 1095
• Publication Date: 2016-07-25
• Subjects: Economics -- Periodicals; Économie politique -- Périodiques; 330.05
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12320
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0013-0133

Abstract

Abstract : Often the fuller the reputational record people's actions generate, the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation. However, inability to 'wipe clean' one's past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation's value in a cycle of bad behaviour, whereas a clean slate could have been followed by their 'reforming' themselves. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate what subjects learn from playing a finitely repeated dilemma game with endogenous, symmetric partner choice. We find that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in cooperative reputation grows following exogenous restarts, although earlier end‐game behaviour is observed.