Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid electricity market: Part 1 – existence and characterization. (3rd June 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Aussel, D.; Bendotti, P.; Pištěk, M.
• Is Part Of: Optimization. Volume 66:Number 6(2017)
• Page Start: 1013
• Page End: 1025
• Publication Date: 2017-06-03
• Subjects: Electricity market -- multi-leader-follower game -- Nash equilibrium -- best response; Mathematical optimization -- Periodicals; 519.7
• DOI: 10.1080/02331934.2016.1227981
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0233-1934

Abstract

Abstract : We consider a model of a pay-as-bid electricity market based on a multi-leader-common-follower approach where the producers as leaders are at the upper level and the regulator as a common follower is at the lower level. We fully characterize Nash equilibria for this model by describing necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence as well as providing explicit formulas of such equilibria in the market.