Rent-seeking behavior of BIM- and IPD-based construction project in China. Issue 3 (15th May 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Mei, Tingting; Wang, Qiankun; Xiao, Yaping; Yang, Mi
• Is Part Of: Engineering, construction and architectural management. Volume 24:Issue 3(2017)
• Page Start: 514
• Page End: 536
• Publication Date: 2017-05-15
• Subjects: China -- Game theory -- Collaboration -- Rent seeking -- Building information model -- Integrated project delivery; Construction industry -- Management -- Periodicals; Engineering -- Management -- Periodicals; Engineering -- Periodicals; Building -- Periodicals; 624.068
• DOI: 10.1108/ECAM-11-2015-0178
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0969-9988

Abstract

Abstract : Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to study the rent-seeking behavior of stakeholders in construction projects and to provide a reference for further studies on collaboration in China, which could thus improve the collaborative management in construction and reduce the waste of resources. Design/methodology/approach: In this paper, the authors discuss and analyze the current situation of rent-seeking behavior in infrastructure construction projects, integrated project delivery (IPD), and the application of a building information model (BIM) in China. The authors analyze the collusive behavior between the supervision department and the contractor via the rent-seeking model on the basis of the game theory and present that BIM and IPD have a positive impact on rent-seeking activities of construction projects. The key factors influencing the rent-seeking activities from the perspective of the owner are studied via a questionnaire survey. Findings: The research status of IPD in China includes the application of IPD, IPD collaborative management and the combination of lean construction (LC), IPD and BIM. The enthusiasm of the adoption of BIM and IPD is higher for design institute, construction units, research institutions and universities. The findings indicate that the owner appears to have a significant influence on stakeholders in construction projects, such as supervising efficiency, rewards and punishment. Therefore, the results also demonstrate that the construction project based on BIM and IPD can effectively avoid the rent-seeking activities of the participants. Research limitations/implications: The findings are primarily based on questionnaire data originated from Central China; hence there are some limitations that are worth noting. Practical implications: First, it provides compelling data evidence for the adoption of BIM and IPD in China. Second, it paves a solid foundation for the behavior of stakeholders in construction projects based on BIM and IPD. Originality/value: In this paper, a game model of contractor, supervisor and owner is established, and a preliminary attempt is made to introduce BIM and IPD into the model for the behavioral research of participants.