Constructing Industrial Order in the Center of the American Economy: How Electoral Competition and Social Collaboration Evolved in Twentieth-Century New York. Issue 1 (9th February 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Amberg, Stephen
• Is Part Of: Studies in American political development. Volume 31:Issue 1(2017)
• Page Start: 108
• Page End: 129
• Publication Date: 2017-02-09
• Subjects: United States -- Politics and government -- Periodicals; 320.97305
• DOI: 10.1017/S0898588X17000013
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0898-588X

Abstract

Abstract : Comparative studies of capitalist political economies have settled on a new understanding of how historical choices about electoral rules were constitutive of the current varieties of capitalism that are distinguished by their strategies of growth and adjustment to competitive conditions. The countries that have "coordinated market economies" typically have well-organized unions and employers with distinct partisan representation under multiparty electoral rules, and they have more egalitarian outcomes. The countries that have "liberal market economies" have arms-length market-based relationships under the plurality rule that are more conflictual, and they have inegalitarian outcomes. This article develops the analysis of electoral rules and industrial order by taking another look at the United States, which has always been taken as a case of plurality and liberal market economy. In contrast, New York had multiparty politics for most of the twentieth century, in part because of its cross-endorsement fusion rule of nominations. This article argues that fusion operated in a similar way to proportional representation to enable labor–management collaboration and social regulation. Collaboration in New York City was a constitutive element of the New Deal's laboristic politics. The later disruption of this American version of coordination transformed the U.S. political economy into a liberal market economy.