Multiple Realizability, Constraints, and Identity. (22nd May 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Bauer, Mark
• Is Part Of: Pacific philosophical quarterly. Volume 94:Number 4(2013:Dec.)
• Page Start: 446
• Page End: 464
• Publication Date: 2013-05-22
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/papq.12008
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0279-0750

Abstract

Abstract: Shapiro has suggested that the empirical plausibility of the multiple realizability of human‐like minds is dubious, because a contrary thesis, the Mental Constraint Thesis, enjoys positive empirical evidence. The Mental Constraint Thesis states that, given the actual physical laws, there is only one way to realize a human‐like mind. I will suggest, however, that the Mental Constraint Thesis is not a contrary to the empirical multiple realizability thesis relevant to psychological reduction or autonomy and, as a consequence, has no bearing on those classificatory issues.