III—The Epistemic Role of Intentions. Issue 1 (2nd September 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Roessler, Johannes
• Is Part Of: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy. Volume 113:Issue 1 : Part 1(2013)
• Page Start: 41
• Page End: 56
• Publication Date: 2013-09-02
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013.00344.x
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0066-7374

Abstract

Abstract : According to David Velleman, it is part of the 'commonsense psychology' of intentional agency that an agent can know what she will do without relying on evidence, in virtue of intending to do it. My question is how this claim is to be interpreted and defended. I argue that the answer turns on the commonsense conception of calculative practical reasoning, and the link between such reasoning and warranted claims to knowledge. I also consider the implications of this argument for Velleman's project of vindicating the commonsense view by showing it to be consistent with an 'evidentialist' epistemology.