Atomic inducements: the case for "buying out" nuclear latency. Issue 3 (3rd July 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Volpe, Tristan A.
• Is Part Of: Nonproliferation review. Volume 23:Issue 3/4(2016)
• Page Start: 481
• Page End: 493
• Publication Date: 2016-07-03
• Subjects: Nuclear power -- nuclear energy -- uranium enrichment -- plutonium reprocessing -- nuclear fuel cycle -- civil nuclear cooperation; 327.17405
• DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2016.1246103
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1073-6700

Abstract

ABSTRACT: This article argues for an updated strategy to limit the spread of sensitive nuclear technology around the globe. Traditional efforts by the United States to deny countries access to enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology are becoming difficult to enforce, while the threat of sanctions against US allies with legal nuclear-energy programs is not credible. As a result, the United States should shift toward a strategy of "buying out" an ally's ambition for sensitive nuclear technology. Offering military, political, and economic assistance in exchange for stringent nonproliferation commitments will only work when offered at the earliest stage of technical development, before the country builds capabilities that will be difficult or expensive to give up. While there are some practical challenges to implementing such a strategy, the conditions are right to see if lucrative nuclear-energy offers—notably spent-waste management solutions—can induce countries with new civil nuclear programs to foreclose the option to develop ENR technology in the future.