A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge. (19th October 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kremer, Michael
• Is Part Of: European journal of philosophy. Volume 25:Number 1(2017:Mar.)
• Page Start: 25
• Page End: 46
• Publication Date: 2016-10-19
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy, European -- Periodicals; Philosophy, Modern -- 20th century -- Periodicals; 190
• DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12150
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0966-8373

Abstract

Abstract: Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that faces a significant challenge: accounting for the unity of knowledge. Jason Stanley, an 'intellectualist' opponent of Ryle's, brings out this problem by arguing that Ryleans must treat 'know' as an ambiguous word and must distinguish knowledge proper from knowledge‐how, which is 'knowledge' only so‐called. I develop the challenge and show that underlying Ryle's distinction is a unified vision of knowledge as 'a capacity to get things right', covering both knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that. I show how Ryle specifies the general notion into knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that and discuss the mutual interdependence exhibited by the two forms of knowledge. Ryle's positive view of knowledge, properly understood, emerges as an important, neglected, alternative which should be brought back into the ongoing conversation about practical and theoretical knowledge.