Agglomeration effect and the "dual-format" e-marketplace pricing scheme. (13th February 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Su, Ping; Liu, Shuguang; Lin, Jun
• Is Part Of: Journal of modelling in management. Volume 12:Number 1(2017)
• Page Start: 19
• Page End: 35
• Publication Date: 2017-02-13
• Subjects: Game theory -- Agglomeration effect -- e-marketplace -- Mixed-strategy equilibrium -- Two-part tariff; Industrial management -- Mathematical models -- Periodicals; Industrial management -- Computer simulation -- Periodicals; Business -- Mathematical models -- Periodicals; Business -- Computer simulation -- Periodicals; 658.4033
• DOI: 10.1108/JM2-06-2016-0048
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1746-5664

Abstract

Abstract : Purpose: This paper aims to study a dominant e-retailer operating its own e-marketplace (B2C) to host peer competitor as well as acting as a traditional retailer ("dual-format" retailing as in Mantin and Krishnan 2014). The dominant retailer offers a two-part tariff charging scheme to a third-party seller. The seller decides whether to join the e-marketplace. The present paper is interested in addressing the following questions: What is the pricing equilibrium before/after the formation of the e-marketplace? What will be the "optimal" charging scheme? What is the impact on the e-marketplace operator if the third-party seller has the option to become "featured". Design/methodology/approach: This paper adopts a stylized model to capture the competition between the two retailers and applies game theory to solve the pricing equilibrium. The authors model the dual-format retailing in a two-stage decision: Stage 1, the e-marketplace operator offers a two-part tariff; Stage 2, if the other retailer is participating, they engage in a pricing competition. They assume that the e-marketplace operator is a profit maximizer by choosing its charging scheme subject to the condition that the participating retailer is no worse off. Findings: The authors find that the e-retailer and the third-party seller in the e-marketplace are not always hurt by intensified price competition. They identify conditions under which higher expected prices are charged as a result of agglomeration effect. The authors' model also provides theoretical evidence on this popular charging scheme, and shows the feasible region in which the e-marketplace operator could allocate the surplus resulted from the formation of the e-marketplace between itself and the participating retailer. Finally, the authors demonstrate that if the third-party seller has the option to become a "featured" retailer (He and Chen, 2006), it can be detrimental to the e-marketplace operator. Originality/value: This work is different in three ways: First, the authors model an e-marketplace adopting a "dual-format" retailing, facing the trade-off between its direct retailing revenue and the rents collected from the member store, while the literature mainly focuses on e-marketplaces playing the intermediary role. Second, they explicitly model the "market expansion effect" caused by the agglomeration after the formation of the e-marketplace. The present study complements this stream of research by investigating and providing theoretical evidence on the charging scheme popularly adopted by the e-marketplaces and proposes ways to share the surplus to the participating store.