Security‐constrained competitive mechanism research for the generation‐side electricity market based on economic mechanism design theory. (28th September 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Zhu, Yonggang; Ying, Liming; Xiong, Hu; Xie, Qingyang
• Is Part Of: International transactions on electrical energy systems. Volume 27:Number 3(2017:Apr.)
• Page Start: n/a
• Page End: n/a
• Publication Date: 2016-09-28
• Subjects: competitive mechanism -- economic mechanism design -- electricity market; Electric power -- Periodicals; Electric power systems -- Periodicals; Electrical engineering -- Periodicals; 621.3
• DOI: 10.1002/etep.2285
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2050-7038

Abstract

Summary: Traditional electricity market mechanisms cannot effectively control strategic behaviors of power generation companies, resulting in reduced market efficiency. Based on the economic mechanism design theory, a decentralized decision‐making competitive mechanism applied in the generation‐side electricity market is developed to reduce the strategic behaviors of generation companies and align individual interests with overall interests. At first, market clearing patterns and characteristics for the generation‐side electricity market are analyzed. Then, a study is conducted on the ideal economic mechanism design to identify 3 main elements of the mechanism, namely, information space, equilibrium information function, and result function. Considering the physical constraints of the electricity system, including generator output constraint and the active power flow constraints for transmission lines, the ideal economic mechanism is refined. Finally, the effectiveness and practicability of the economic mechanism are verified through simulation on IEEE‐14 system.