HUMAN COOPERATION BASED ON PUNISHMENT REPUTATION. (9th April 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: dos Santos, Miguel; Rankin, Daniel J.; Wedekind, Claus
• Is Part Of: Evolution. Volume 67:Number 8(2013:Aug.)
• Page Start: 2446
• Page End: 2450
• Publication Date: 2013-04-09
• Subjects: Experimental game theory -- indirect reciprocity -- punishment; Evolution -- Periodicals; Heredity -- Periodicals; Évolution (Biologie) -- Périodiques; Hérédité -- Périodiques; 338.47004094
• DOI: 10.1111/evo.12108
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0014-3820

Abstract

Abstract : The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within‐group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.