A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux. (January 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Andow, James
• Is Part Of: Metaphilosophy. Volume 48:Number 1/2(2017)
• Page Start: 183
• Page End: 195
• Publication Date: 2017-01
• Subjects: intuitions -- metaphilosophy -- philosophical methodology -- evidence -- descriptive evidentialism -- epistemology of philosophy -- defence of intuitions -- intuitions; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/meta.12225
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0026-1068

Abstract

Abstract: Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneux's arguments are that: (1) the propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited; (2) intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence; and (3) certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are treated as inadmissible in the context of justification. This article presents a partial defence of descriptive evidentialism against these new arguments.