Finding a Nash equilibrium and an optimal sharing policy for multiagent network expansion game. Issue 1 (14th October 2016)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- Finding a Nash equilibrium and an optimal sharing policy for multiagent network expansion game. Issue 1 (14th October 2016)
- Main Title:
- Finding a Nash equilibrium and an optimal sharing policy for multiagent network expansion game
- Authors:
- Chaabane, Nadia
Briand, Cyril
Huguet, Marie‐José
Agnetis, Alessandro - Abstract:
- Abstract : In this work, a multiagent network flow problem is addressed, aiming at characterizing the properties of stable flows and allowing their computation. Two types of agents are considered: transportation‐agents, that carry a flow of products on a given network and another agent, either a producer or a customer, who is willing to ship (receive, respectively), products. Every transportation‐agent controls a set of arcs, each having a capacity that can be increased up to a certain point at a given cost. The other agent (i.e., the customer/producer) is interested in maximizing the flow transshipped through the network. To this aim, we assume it offers the transportation‐agents a reward that is proportional to the realized flow value. This particular multiagent framework is referred to as a Multiagent network expansion game. We characterize and find particular stable strategies (i.e., Nash equilibria) that are of interest for this game. We particularly focus on the problem of finding a Nash Equilibrium and a sharing policy that maximize the value of the total flow. We prove that this problem is NP‐hard in the strong sense and show how such a strategy can be characterized considering paths in specific auxiliary graphs. We also provide a mixed integer linear programming formulation to solve the problem. Computational experiments are provided to prove the effectiveness of our approach and derive some insights for practitioners. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. NETWORKS, Vol.Abstract : In this work, a multiagent network flow problem is addressed, aiming at characterizing the properties of stable flows and allowing their computation. Two types of agents are considered: transportation‐agents, that carry a flow of products on a given network and another agent, either a producer or a customer, who is willing to ship (receive, respectively), products. Every transportation‐agent controls a set of arcs, each having a capacity that can be increased up to a certain point at a given cost. The other agent (i.e., the customer/producer) is interested in maximizing the flow transshipped through the network. To this aim, we assume it offers the transportation‐agents a reward that is proportional to the realized flow value. This particular multiagent framework is referred to as a Multiagent network expansion game. We characterize and find particular stable strategies (i.e., Nash equilibria) that are of interest for this game. We particularly focus on the problem of finding a Nash Equilibrium and a sharing policy that maximize the value of the total flow. We prove that this problem is NP‐hard in the strong sense and show how such a strategy can be characterized considering paths in specific auxiliary graphs. We also provide a mixed integer linear programming formulation to solve the problem. Computational experiments are provided to prove the effectiveness of our approach and derive some insights for practitioners. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. NETWORKS, Vol. 69(1), 94–109 2017 … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- Networks. Volume 69:Issue 1(2017)
- Journal:
- Networks
- Issue:
- Volume 69:Issue 1(2017)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 69, Issue 1 (2017)
- Year:
- 2017
- Volume:
- 69
- Issue:
- 1
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2017-0069-0001-0000
- Page Start:
- 94
- Page End:
- 109
- Publication Date:
- 2016-10-14
- Subjects:
- multiagent network flow -- Nash equilibria -- complexity -- network expansion game -- mixed integer linear programming
Network analysis (Planning) -- Periodicals
658.4032 - Journal URLs:
- http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/(ISSN)1097-0037 ↗
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1002/net.21711 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0028-3045
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 6077.205000
British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 2368.xml