Information and financial crisis policy-making. Issue 3 (9th March 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Gandrud, Christopher; O'Keeffe, Mícheál
• Is Part Of: Journal of European public policy. Volume 24:Issue 3(2017)
• Page Start: 386
• Page End: 405
• Publication Date: 2017-03-09
• Subjects: Bailout -- bank guarantees -- banking crisis -- financial crisis policy-making -- Ireland -- signalling game; European Union countries -- Politics and government -- Periodicals; Political planning -- European Union countries -- Periodicals; Politique publique -- Pays de l'Union européenne -- Périodiques; Pays de l'Union européenne -- Politique et gouvernement -- Périodiques; 361.61094
• DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1149205
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1350-1763

Abstract

ABSTRACT: The degree to which governments intervene to contain financial crises varies considerably. We aim to understand why policy-makers choose the level of intervention they do to contain financial shocks. In particular, we want to understand why policy-makers may choose policies that create outcomes they do not want. We focus on a defining feature of financial crisis policy-making that has been largely unaddressed in the literature on policy responses to crises: policy-makers lack good information about the health of their banking systems. So they rely on their bureaucrats and other actors for necessary information. However, information providers may have different policy preferences. To understand the interactions between these actors and the implications for policy choice, we advance a signalling game of financial crisis containment. We use a case study of the recent Irish crisis to demonstrate how information asymmetries can have a significant impact on bailout choices.