Counterinsurgency Challenge in Post-2001 Afghanistan. (2nd January 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Giustozzi, Antonio
• Is Part Of: Small wars & insurgencies. Volume 28:Number 1(2017)
• Page Start: 12
• Page End: 33
• Publication Date: 2017-01-02
• Subjects: Afghanistan -- insurgency -- counterinsurgency -- Afghan army -- Afghan police -- Afghan local police -- ISAF -- resolute support -- power brokers; Low-intensity conflicts (Military science) -- Periodicals; Insurgency -- Periodicals; 355.021805
• DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2016.1266126
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0959-2318

Abstract

Abstract: Although the Taliban insurgency was internally divided and unable to coordinate its activities in 2014–2015, the Afghan security forces were not able to contain it and steadily lost ground throughout 2015. Until 2015, there had been little effort to develop an indigenous Afghan counterinsurgency strategy, but a sense of urgency emerged after a string of Taliban victories. At the beginning of 2016, it was still not clear if and when the National Unity Government would be able to produce a counterinsurgency strategy and, in any case, the need for a coherent counterinsurgency approach became questionable as the Taliban appeared to be transitioning towards conventional warfare.