When Will New Programs be Mandatory? Determinants of the Decision Between the Mandatory and Discretionary Budget Designs. Issue 1 (2nd January 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kasdin, Stuart Roy
• Is Part Of: Congress & the presidency. Volume 44:Issue 1(2017)
• Page Start: 120
• Page End: 142
• Publication Date: 2017-01-02
• Subjects: Presidents -- United States -- Periodicals; United States -- Politics and government -- Periodicals; Periodicals; 328.73005
• DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2016.1263979
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0734-3469

Abstract

Abstract : When creating a new program, an authorizing committee must choose a budget structure, either using mandatory funding or creating an authorization for appropriations to enable the appropriation committees to use discretionary funding. One hypothesis we examine is based on the strategic interplay by congressional committees seeking to control their policy domains. Based on expected purposes of a nascent program, an authorization committee must calculate, whether, if a program is designed as requiring appropriations for spending, will the appropriators provide the funds? Or if instead, a program is funded through mandatory spending, will those funds be blocked by appropriators? For example, when a new program is likely to offer credit claiming opportunities to Congress, such as through legislative earmarks, the authorization committees are less likely design a program to rely on mandatory funding. An alternative hypothesis is that where there is greater expected difficulty in predicting likely program needs—e.g., predicting the annual spending needs for unemployment insurance—a mandatory structure would be expected. We find that the hypothesis associated with the committees' pursuit of autonomy is supported, whereas the rational design hypothesis associated with reduced transaction costs is not supported.