Interest Organizations and Distributive Politics: Small-Business Subsidies in Mexico. (August 2016)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- Interest Organizations and Distributive Politics: Small-Business Subsidies in Mexico. (August 2016)
- Main Title:
- Interest Organizations and Distributive Politics: Small-Business Subsidies in Mexico
- Authors:
- Palmer-Rubin, Brian
- Abstract:
- Highlights: I analyze the distribution of subsidies to business organizations in Mexico. I use original data on the subnational distribution of small-business subsidies. Competition encourages politicians to allocate benefits to non-core organizations. Dominant parties concentrate benefits in electoral allies. Summary: Politicians often use distributive programs to build and maintain electoral linkages with interest organizations. This project analyzes the factors that lead Mexican state governments to allocate distributive benefits to small-business organizations (SBOs) rather than directly to entrepreneurs or to other groups. Theoretically, I address how electoral threats to the ruling party shape the incentives of politicians to deliver benefits to core and non-core interest organizations. Using an original dataset of decentralized small-business subsidies, I deploy a novel subnational design, comparing states governed by parties with different relationships to SBOs, facing different levels of electoral threat. I find that electoral competition shapes politicians' incentives for incorporating organizations in distributive spending. Governors from the pro-small-business PAN increase allocations to SBOs when they are electorally strong, while governors from the centrist PRI allocate more to these organizations when they face an electoral threat. Case studies provide additional evidence that ruling politicians allocate benefits to SBOs when linkages with these groupsHighlights: I analyze the distribution of subsidies to business organizations in Mexico. I use original data on the subnational distribution of small-business subsidies. Competition encourages politicians to allocate benefits to non-core organizations. Dominant parties concentrate benefits in electoral allies. Summary: Politicians often use distributive programs to build and maintain electoral linkages with interest organizations. This project analyzes the factors that lead Mexican state governments to allocate distributive benefits to small-business organizations (SBOs) rather than directly to entrepreneurs or to other groups. Theoretically, I address how electoral threats to the ruling party shape the incentives of politicians to deliver benefits to core and non-core interest organizations. Using an original dataset of decentralized small-business subsidies, I deploy a novel subnational design, comparing states governed by parties with different relationships to SBOs, facing different levels of electoral threat. I find that electoral competition shapes politicians' incentives for incorporating organizations in distributive spending. Governors from the pro-small-business PAN increase allocations to SBOs when they are electorally strong, while governors from the centrist PRI allocate more to these organizations when they face an electoral threat. Case studies provide additional evidence that ruling politicians allocate benefits to SBOs when linkages with these groups contribute to their most pressing electoral objectives. … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- World development. Volume 84(2016)
- Journal:
- World development
- Issue:
- Volume 84(2016)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 84, Issue 2016 (2016)
- Year:
- 2016
- Volume:
- 84
- Issue:
- 2016
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2016-0084-2016-0000
- Page Start:
- 97
- Page End:
- 117
- Publication Date:
- 2016-08
- Subjects:
- distributive politics -- interest organizations -- small-business subsidies -- Mexico -- Latin America
Economic history -- 1990- -- Periodicals
Economic assistance -- Developing countries -- Periodicals
330.9 - Journal URLs:
- http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0305750X ↗
http://www.elsevier.com/journals ↗ - DOI:
- 10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.03.019 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 0305-750X
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 9354.150000
British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 2527.xml