Limits of propositionalism. Issue 7 (16th November 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Grzankowski, Alex
• Is Part Of: Inquiry. Volume 59:Issue 7/8(2016)
• Page Start: 819
• Page End: 838
• Publication Date: 2016-11-16
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Social sciences -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Social Sciences -- Periodicals; Electronic journals; Philosophie -- Périodiques; Sciences sociales -- Philosophie -- Périodiques; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2016.1157034
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0020-174X

Abstract

Abstract: Propositionalists hold that, fundamentally, all attitudes are propositional attitudes. A number of philosophers have recently called the propositionalist thesis into question. It has been argued, successfully I believe, that there are attitudes that are of or about things but which do not have a propositional content concerning those things. If correct, our theories of mind will include non-propositional attitudes as well as propositional attitudes. In light of this, Sinhababu's recent attack on anti-propositionalists is noteworthy. The present paper aims to sharpen his worries and show that they fail for a range of reasons. Besides merely offering a reply, considering his challenges provides an opportunity to add clarity to this emerging area of research and it allows one to strengthen the case against propositionalism more generally.