EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY, EPISTEMIC PREEMPTION, AND THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES. (15th December 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Wright, Sarah
• Is Part Of: Episteme. Volume 13:Number 4(2016)
• Page Start: 555
• Page End: 570
• Publication Date: 2016-12-15
• Subjects: Social epistemology -- Periodicals; 121
• DOI: 10.1017/epi.2016.31
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1742-3600

Abstract

ABSTRACT: How does the intellectually virtuous person respond to the beliefs of those whom they judge to be their epistemic superiors? Linda Zagzebski argues that we ought to take the beliefs of those we judge to be our epistemic authorities as a preemptive reason to believe the same. Zagzebski's argument for this preemption is intended to be an extension of Joseph Raz's argument for political authority. After exploring Zagzebski's specific formulation of epistemic preemption, I argue that epistemic authority is significantly different from political authority; hence Raz's arguments cannot be extended to the epistemic case. Further, I demonstrate that a virtue epistemic perspective will recommend against epistemic preemption. Such preemption brings about a problematic closed-mindedness to ourselves and is an extreme reaction more suited to epistemic vice than to epistemic virtue.