William E. Connolly's Politics of Complexity: A Critique. Issue 1 (9th January 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Fear, Christopher
• Is Part Of: Review of politics. Volume 79:Issue 1(2017:Winter)
• Page Start: 73
• Page End: 98
• Publication Date: 2017-01-09
• Subjects: 320.5
• DOI: 10.1017/S0034670516000735
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0034-6705

Abstract

Abstract: In recent years, William E. Connolly has argued that the phenomenon of complexity in the physical sciences carries radical implications for political theory: namely, that political theorists should now be revising their concepts of agency, responsibility, and freedom. This very recent project of Connolly's has not (yet) attracted much opposition. Here I offer a critique of Connolly's argument which focuses on three key areas: (1) how he interprets and deploys "evidence" from physical science; (2) his theory of " creative freedom"; and (3) the impact that his recent philosophy has on the idea of the intellect. I argue that Connolly's scientific evidence is not what he claims it is; that the theory of "creative freedom" he offers fails; and that his critique of the intellect fails in theory, and would be highly damaging in practice.