Empowering irrigation: A game-theoretic approach to electricity utilization in Indian agriculture. (December 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kimmich, Christian; Sagebiel, Julian
• Is Part Of: Utilities policy. Volume 43(2017)Part B
• Page Start: 174
• Page End: 185
• Publication Date: 2016-12
• Subjects: Demand-side management -- Network externality -- Common-pool resource -- Energy–water nexus -- Electricity; Public utilities -- United States -- Periodicals; Public utilities -- Government policy -- United States -- Periodicals; 363.6
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2016.10.002
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0957-1787

Abstract

Abstract: This research uses a game-theoretic approach to analyze electric power provision for irrigation in Andhra Pradesh, based on results from interview and survey data. Farmers face a coordination problem of collectively preserving electric power quality and a linked dilemma of obtaining sufficient electric infrastructure capacity from utilities. Low equilibria prevail due to asymmetric payoffs and farmers not knowing electric network properties. The findings derived from survey data, empirical tests, and model synthesis indicate how the capacity dilemma can be overcome to enable coordinated technology adoption via farmers' and utilities' investment into energy-efficient and economically viable technology. Coordinated demand-side measures could effectively reduce energy use and support adaptation to climate change. Highlights: Low equilibrium trap of the electricity–irrigation nexus in India is analyzed. Electric infrastructure is shaped by common-pool and network properties. Two linked game-theoretic models are built for power quality and electric load. A survey provides data to bound model parameters and test empirical outcomes. Solving capacity dilemmas enables coordinated demand-side technology adoption.