A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection. (31st March 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Elpidorou, Andreas
• Is Part Of: Pacific philosophical quarterly. Volume 97:Number 4(2016:Dec.)
• Page Start: 474
• Page End: 500
• Publication Date: 2015-03-31
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/papq.12068
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0279-0750

Abstract

Abstract: Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature of their referents in a partial and incomplete manner, a posteriori physicalism is safe.