Strategic thinking under social influence: Scalability, stability and robustness of allocations. (November 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Bauso, Dario; Başar, Tamer
• Is Part Of: European journal of control. Volume 32(2016:Nov.)
• Page Start: 1
• Page End: 15
• Publication Date: 2016-11
• Subjects: Mean-field games -- Coalitional game theory -- Differential games -- Optimal control; Control theory -- Periodicals; Automatic control -- Periodicals; Automatic control -- Mathematics -- Periodicals; Electronic journals; 629.805
• DOI: 10.1016/j.ejcon.2016.04.006
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0947-3580

Abstract

Abstract: This paper studies the strategic behavior of a large number of game designers and studies the scalability, stability and robustness of their allocations in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU). For each TU game, the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. In each game, a game designer allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The approach is based on the theory of mean-field games with heterogeneous groups in a multi-population regime.