Verbal Disagreements and Philosophical Scepticism. Issue 4 (1st October 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Ballantyne, Nathan
• Is Part Of: Australasian journal of philosophy. Volume 94:Issue 4(2016)
• Page Start: 752
• Page End: 765
• Publication Date: 2016-10-01
• Subjects: verbal disagreement -- epistemology of disagreement -- scepticism -- metaphilosophy -- higher-order evidence; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Psychology -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2016.1149200
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0004-8402

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Many philosophers have suggested that disagreement is good grounds for scepticism. One response says that disagreement-motivated scepticism can be mitigated to some extent by the thesis that philosophical disputes are often verbal, not genuine. I consider the implications of this anti-sceptical strategy, arguing that it trades one kind of scepticism for others. I conclude with suggestions for further investigation of the epistemic significance of the nature of philosophical disagreement.