Value modelling for multi-stakeholder and multi-objective optimisation in engineering design. Issue 10 (2nd October 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Papageorgiou, Evangelos; Eres, Murat Hakki; Scanlan, James
• Is Part Of: Journal of engineering design. Volume 27:Issue 10(2016)
• Page Start: 697
• Page End: 724
• Publication Date: 2016-10-02
• Subjects: Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) -- analytic hierarchy process (AHP) -- multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) -- Nash equilibrium -- Nash bargaining solution (NBS); Engineering design -- Periodicals; Design, Industrial -- Periodicals; Industrial engineering -- Periodicals; 620.0042
• DOI: 10.1080/09544828.2016.1214693
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0954-4828

Abstract

ABSTRACT: The work presented culminates in the development of a value model used in the conceptual phase of engineering design, with the preferences of more than one stakeholder addressed in the multi-stakeholder and multi-objective optimisation. The 'value' of proposed solutions is assessed in an objective way from both performance and economic perspectives, while the optimal solution is identified based on the needs of the user and manufacturer, as major stakeholders. This novel value model for consistent value assessment synthesises the multi-attribute value/utility analysis with Game Theory and Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) assessment methodologies. During the multi-criteria decision analysis, the deficiencies, introduced by the arbitrary numerical scales used in the AHP to convert the linguistic preferences of the user between the various attributes to numerical values, are resolved. The preferences of a group of experts/decision-makers are synthesised in the group value model through the extraction of weighting factors from the individuals' AHP pairwise comparison matrices. Moreover, Game Theory is used in a hybrid cooperative/bargaining, non-cooperative non-zero sum game between the stakeholders as players, identifying the optimal design through the simultaneous employment of the Nash bargaining solution and the Nash equilibrium.