Bypassing Congressional Committees: Parties, Panel Rosters, and Deliberative Processes. Issue 3 (11th May 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Bendix, William
• Is Part Of: Legislative studies quarterly. Volume 41:Issue 3(2016:Aug.)
• Page Start: 687
• Page End: 714
• Publication Date: 2016-05-11
• Subjects: Legislative bodies -- Periodicals; Parlement; Procédure législative; Système parlementaire; Étude comparée (Descripteur de forme); Périodique électronique (Descripteur de forme); Ressource Internet (Descripteur de forme); 328
• DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12125
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0362-9805

Abstract

Abstract : Although scholars have examined committee rosters extensively, no study has considered the relationship between the ideological composition of panels and their participation in bill drafting. I thus ask: Which committees are frequently excluded from legislative deliberations? Does the composition of committees affect the degree to which they contribute to bill development? Using DW‐NOMINATE data, I calculate ideological scores for congressional panels between 1989 and 2010 to see whether certain committees are routinely bypassed. I find that moderate panels, polarized panels, and panels with moderate chairs are often excluded, while extreme committees in the majority direction tend to retain bill‐writing duties.