'Look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under't': mimicking behaviour of growth-oriented terrorist organizations. Issue 5 (2nd September 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Hendel, Ulrich
• Is Part Of: Defence and peace economics. Volume 27:Issue 5(2016)
• Page Start: 665
• Page End: 687
• Publication Date: 2016-09-02
• Subjects: Terrorism -- Counter-terrorism -- Game theory -- Signalling game; H56 -- C72 -- D82; Military readiness -- Economic aspects -- Periodicals; Disarmament -- Economic aspects -- Periodicals; 338.47355
• DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2014.996006
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1024-2694

Abstract

Abstract : This paper examines the interaction between a growth-oriented terrorist organization and an uninformed government based on a two-period signalling game. Combining the signalling game and organizational growth approaches of previous contributions, this paper shows that, if a terrorist group follows a growth strategy, it has an incentive to appear weaker than it is by mimicking the behaviour of a smaller organization. Depending on its beliefs about the extent of the terrorist threat, it can be optimal for a government to spend more on second-period counter-terrorism measures if it is not attacked in the first period than if it were attacked.