Racial Inequality. (3rd May 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Hull, George
• Is Part Of: Philosophical papers. Volume 45:Number 1/2(2016)
• Page Start: 37
• Page End: 74
• Publication Date: 2016-05-03
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy, African -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2016.1199172
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0556-8641

Abstract

Abstract: In societies with a history of racial oppression, present-day relations between members of different racialised groups are often difficult, tense, prone to escalate into open hostility. This can partly be put down to the persistence of racist beliefs and sentiments. But it is plausible to think there are also non-racist ways in which societal relations between members of different racialised groups go seriously wrong. This is not to downplay the extent to which racism persists: rather, the point is that there exist forms of race-based interaction which, though not racist, are objectionable in their own right. Social equality theory—which understands the ideal of equality not distributively but relationally—can help us to identify and delineate some of these. Taking a social egalitarian approach, I argue that one can identify at least three types of distinctively race-based social inequality, besides racism, which need to be overcome before a society of equals can be realised: 'racial stigma', 'racial discomfort' and 'race-based inequality of moral stature'. These forms of race-based social inequality, or 'racial inequality', are qualitatively different and call for different types of remedy. Delineating these forms of racial inequality also sheds light on the issue of whether racialised identities should be conserved.