Kant's Racism. (3rd May 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Allais, Lucy
• Is Part Of: Philosophical papers. Volume 45:Number 1/2(2016)
• Page Start: 1
• Page End: 36
• Publication Date: 2016-05-03
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy, African -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2016.1199170
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0556-8641

Abstract

Abstract: After a long period of comparative neglect, in the last few decades growing numbers of philosophers have been paying attention to the startling contrast presented between Kant's universal moral theory, with its inspiring enlightenment ideas of human autonomy, equality and dignity and Kant's racism. Against Charles Mills, who argues that the way to make Kant consistent is by attributing to him a threshold notion of moral personhood, according to which some races do not qualify for consideration under the categorical imperative, I argue that Kant cannot be made consistent on race, and that rather than trying to make him so, we should use the example of Kant's racism to tell us something about the nature of racism. I argue that Kant's own moral philosophy and moral psychology in fact give some materials for thinking about his racism, and about racism.