What Is an Inconsistent Truth Table?. Issue 3 (2nd July 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Weber, Zach; Badia, Guillermo; Girard, Patrick
• Is Part Of: Australasian journal of philosophy. Volume 94:Issue 3(2016)
• Page Start: 533
• Page End: 548
• Publication Date: 2016-07-02
• Subjects: paraconsistent logic -- non-classical mathematics -- dialetheism; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Psychology -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2015.1093010
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0004-8402

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Do truth tables—the ordinary sort that we use in teaching and explaining basic propositional logic—require an assumption of consistency for their construction? In this essay we show that truth tables can be built in a consistency-independent paraconsistent setting, without any appeal to classical logic. This is evidence for a more general claim—that when we write down the orthodox semantic clauses for a logic, whatever logic we presuppose in the background will be the logic that appears in the foreground. Rather than any one logic being privileged, then, on this count partisans across the logical spectrum are in relatively similar dialectical positions.