A strategic model for state compliance verification. (26th May 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Listner, Clemens; Niemeyer, Irmgard; Canty, Morton; Stein, Gotthard
• Is Part Of: Naval research logistics. Volume 63:Number 3(2016:Apr.)
• Page Start: 260
• Page End: 271
• Publication Date: 2016-05-26
• Subjects: game theory -- decision support systems -- problem structuring -- graph theory; Logistics, Naval -- Periodicals; Supplies and stores -- Periodicals; 359.07
• DOI: 10.1002/nav.21689
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0894-069X

Abstract

Abstract: The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016