Why genes are like lemons. (June 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Boem, F.; Ratti, E.; Andreoletti, M.; Boniolo, G.
• Is Part Of: Studies in history and philosophy of science. Volume 57(2016)
• Page Start: 88
• Page End: 95
• Publication Date: 2016-06
• Subjects: Gene -- Theoretical terms -- Natural kinds -- Biological functions -- Philosophy of science contribution to science; Biology -- Periodicals; Natural history -- Periodicals; Biology -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Medicine -- History -- Periodicals; Medicine -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; Bioethics -- Periodicals; Biologie -- Histoire -- Périodiques; Biologie -- Philosophie -- Périodiques; Sciences de la santé -- Histoire -- Périodiques; Sciences de la santé -- Philosophie -- Périodiques; Médecine -- Histoire -- Périodiques; Médecine -- Philosophie -- Périodiques; 570.1
• DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2016.04.005
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1369-8486

Abstract

Abstract: In the last few years, the lack of a unitary notion of gene across biological sciences has troubled the philosophy of biology community. However, the debate on this concept has remained largely historical or focused on particular cases presented by the scientific empirical advancements. Moreover, in the literature there are no explicit and reasonable arguments about why a philosophical clarification of the concept of gene is needed. In our paper, we claim that a philosophical clarification of the concept of gene does not contribute to biology. Unlike the question, for example, "What is a biological function?", we argue that the question "What is a gene?" could be answered by means of empirical research, in the sense that biologists' labour is enough to shed light on it. Highlights: We claim that the epistemic debate in philosophy on the notion of gene provides poor contribution to biology. Unlike in the case of notions such as function, philosophy provides only conceptual systematization in the debate on gene. We show that the main problems on the topic of the gene are technical and empirical rather than genuinely philosophical. Provocatively, we suggest that the notion of gene is puzzling as much as the notion of lemon.