Collective Action to Avoid Catastrophe: When Countries Succeed, When They Fail, and Why. (May 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Barrett, Scott
• Other Names: van Aaken Anne guestEditor.; Antonovics Janis guestEditor.
• Is Part Of: Global policy. Volume 7(2016)Supplement 1
• Page Start: 45
• Page End: 55
• Publication Date: 2016-05
• Subjects: Globalization -- Periodicals; International relations -- Periodicals; World politics -- Periodicals; 327.1705
• DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12324
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1758-5880

Abstract

Abstract: This article is concerned with situations in which avoiding a catastrophic outcome requires collective action. Using the logic of simple game theory, I identify circumstances that would cause rational players to act so as to guarantee that a catastrophe occurs, even when it is in their collective interests to avoid such an outcome – and when these players have the means at their disposal to ensure that such an outcome is avoided. I also identify circumstances that would cause rational players to act in concert to avert a catastrophe, and explain why other circumstances that might seem relevant to explaining these outcomes may be entirely inconsequential. Most of my discussion focuses on climate change. However, I also explain the relevance of the approach to three other areas: the millennium bug, drug resistance and nuclear arms control. In the final sections I discuss whether and how institutions might be designed to overcome, or at least reduce the likelihood of, catastrophic collective‐action failures at the international level. Abstract : To date, no one has proposed a politically acceptable approach to limiting, as opposed to simply attenuating, climate change.