A characterization of single‐peaked preferences via random social choice functions. Issue 2 (17th May 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava; Zeng, Huaxia
• Is Part Of: Theoretical economics. Volume 11:Issue 2(2016:May)
• Page Start: 711
• Page End: 733
• Publication Date: 2016-05-17
• Subjects: Random social choice functions -- strategy‐proofness -- compromise -- single‐peaked preferences; D71; Economics -- Periodicals; 330.01
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1972
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1933-6837

Abstract

Abstract : This paper proves the following result: every path‐connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy‐proof, unanimous, tops‐only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property is single‐peaked. Conversely, every single‐peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single‐peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. The paper provides a justification of the salience of single‐peaked preferences and evidence in favor of the Gul conjecture ([Barberà, 2010] ).