Provably secure identity‐based encryption resilient to post‐challenge continuous auxiliary input leakage. Issue 10 (18th December 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Li, Jiguo; Guo, Yuyan; Yu, Qihong; Lu, Yang; Zhang, Yichen
• Is Part Of: Security and communication networks. Volume 9:Issue 10(2016)
• Page Start: 1016
• Page End: 1024
• Publication Date: 2015-12-18
• Subjects: post‐challenge -- continuous auxiliary inputs -- leakage resilient -- composite order group; Computer networks -- Security measures -- Periodicals; Computer security -- Periodicals; Cryptography -- Periodicals; 005.805
• DOI: 10.1002/sec.1396
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1939-0114

Abstract

Abstract: The situation for post‐challenge continuous auxiliary input leakage has not been considered in the cryptography schemes for previous literature. We present a semantic‐security model with post‐challenge continuous auxiliary inputs for identity‐based encryption. In this model, the adversary is permitted to obtain some information of the private keys constantly and to query more information after seeing the challenge ciphertext through the side‐channel attacks. Furthermore, we present an identity‐based encryption scheme resilient to leakage under composite order groups. Our scheme is secure against post‐challenge continuous auxiliary input, adaptive chosen‐identity, and adaptive chosen plaintext attacks under three static assumptions in the standard model. Compared with existing identity‐based encryption schemes under security properties and performance, our scheme is practical. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Abstract : In this paper, we propose a semantic‐security model with post‐challenge continuous auxiliary inputs for identity‐based encryption. Furthermore, we present an identity‐based encryption scheme resilient to leakage under composite order groups. Our scheme is secure against post‐challenge continuous auxiliary input, adaptive chosen‐identity, and adaptive chosen plaintext attacks under three static assumptions in the standard model. Compared with existing identity‐based encryption schemes under security properties and performance, our scheme is practical.